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With the development of functional neuroimaging, important progress has been made in
identifying the brain regions involved in self-related processing. One of the most consistent
findings has been that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is activated when peo-
ple contemplate various aspects of themselves and their life, such their traits, experiences,
preferences, abilities, and goals. Recent evidence suggests that this region may not support
the act of self-reflection per se, but its precise function in self-processing remains unclear.
In this article, I examine the hypothesis that the vMPFC may contribute to assign personal
value or significance to self-related contents: stimuli and mental representations that refer
or relate to the self tend to be assigned unique value or significance, and the function of the
vMPFC may precisely be to evaluate or represent such significance. Although relatively few
studies to date have directly tested this hypothesis, several lines of evidence converge to
suggest that vMPFC activity during self-processing depends on the personal significance
of self-related contents. First, increasing psychological distance from self-representations
leads to decreased activation in the vMPFC. Second, the magnitude of vMPFC activation
increases linearly with the personal importance attributed to self-representations. Third,
the activity of the vMPFC is modulated by individual differences in the interest placed on
self-reflection. Finally, the evidence shows that the vMPFC responds to outer aspects of
self that have high personal value, such as possessions and close others. By assigning
personal value to self-related contents, the vMPFC may play an important role in the con-
struction, stabilization, and modification of self-representations, and ultimately in guiding
our choices and decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
As James (1890) pointed out in his insightful piece on the self, each
of us inevitably makes a fundamental division of his or her sub-
jective world into two halves, establishing a distinction between
what is considered as “me” (or “mine”) and what is considered
as “not-me” (or “not-mine”). James further emphasized that the
two sides of the division are far from being treated equally: “the
altogether unique kind of interest which each human mind feels
in those parts of creation which it can call me or mine may be a
moral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological fact” (p. 289).
This idea that we attach unique significance to self-related con-
tents may prove useful for interpreting one of the most consistent
findings that has emerged from neuroimaging research on self-
processing. Over the past decade, a growing number of studies
have shown that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is
activated when people contemplate various aspects of themselves
and their life, such their traits, experiences, preferences, abilities,
and goals (Northoff et al., 2006; Lieberman, 2010; D’Argembeau
and Salmon, 2012; Wagner et al., 2012; Martinelli et al., 2013).
However, while it is now common to see the vMPFC referenced as
a “self region,” the precise mental operations mediated by this area
remain poorly understood. Currently, there is no consensus on
what this region really does when people think about themselves
(for different views, see e.g., Amodio and Frith, 2006; Schmitz and
Johnson, 2007; Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Mitchell, 2009; Northoff
et al., 2011; Lieberman, 2012).
In this article, I examine the hypothesis that the vMPFC may
contribute to generating the “unique kind of interest” in self-
related contents that William James emphasized. Many studies
have shown that the vMPFC plays a key role in representing the
affective significance or subjective value of various types of stimuli
(for review, see Rangel and Hare, 2010; Levy and Glimcher, 2012;
Roy et al., 2012). Most of these studies focused on the processing
of stimuli from the external environment that, at first sight, have
nothing to do with self-representations. Could it be, however, that
the vMPFC plays a similar role in self-processing? In other words,
could it be that the vMPFC contributes to assign value or signifi-
cance to self-related contents? Before examining this hypothesis, I
first specify what is meant by “self” in this context and then pro-
vide an overview of functional neuroimaging studies showing the
involvement of the vMPFC in self-processing.
THE MULTIFACETED SELF
Any attempt at synthesizing the numerous definitions and con-
ceptualizations of the self that have been proposed in various
fields – including philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychology,
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and psychiatry – can easily become a daunting task. Yet it is impor-
tant to clarify what one means by “self” in order to avoid any
misunderstanding about the implications of neuroimaging find-
ings on this topic (Zahavi and Roepstorff, 2011). Although there
is debate on how best to characterize different components of the
self, there is some consensus on the idea that the self is not a single
entity, but instead a construct that encompasses multiple facets
that are supported by distinct processes (Neisser, 1988; Dama-
sio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000; Leary and Tangney, 2003; Morin, 2006;
Klein and Gangi, 2010). Within this multi-component framework,
one can draw a broad distinction between two main aspects of self:
the self as experiencing subject (i.e., the consciousness of oneself
as an immediate subject of experience, which generates a sense
of personal agency and ownership over behavioral actions and
sensory representations) and the self as object of knowledge (i.e.,
the representation and evaluation of one’s personal characteristics
and experiences) (James, 1890; Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000;
Legrand, 2007; Klein, 2012; Prebble et al., 2013).
Most psychological and cognitive neuroscience investigations
to date have focused on the self as object of knowledge (Legrand
and Ruby, 2009; Christoff et al., 2011; Klein, 2012), and this is
the aspect of self that is addressed in the current article. The
self as object is itself composed of multiple systems or compo-
nents, including the ability to recognize one’s physical appearance
(Devue and Brédart, 2011), representations of one’s personality
traits and other personal attributes (Klein and Lax, 2010), memo-
ries of one’s past experiences and knowledge of facts about one’s
life (Conway, 2005; Renoult et al., 2012), representations of per-
sonal goals and projected future experiences (Markus and Nurius,
1986; D’Argembeau et al., 2012b). The self-as-object can also be
conceived as including stimuli that are not, strictly speaking, part
of the individual but that somehow relate or belong to the self,
such as close others and possessions (James, 1890; Belk, 1988; Aron
et al., 2004). Although under normal circumstances these differ-
ent constituents of the self-as-object interact with each other, they
are at least partly dissociable (i.e., one component can operate
independently from another). For example, there is substantial
evidence that knowledge of one’s personality traits is functionally
independent from memories of one’s past experiences (for review,
see Klein et al., 2008).
MEDIAL PREFRONTAL INVOLVEMENT IN PROCESSING
SELF-RELATED CONTENTS
The self and its different components are in all likelihood not
“located” in a single place in the brain, but may instead depend
on distributed neural systems that include both cortical and sub-
cortical structures (Northoff and Panksepp, 2008; Damasio, 2010).
Quite remarkably, however, there is growing evidence that the pro-
cessing of various types of self-related contents – which form parts
of the self-as-object – is commonly associated with activation of
the medial portion of the prefrontal cortex (for recent reviews and
meta-analyses, see Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2010;
Qin and Northoff, 2011; Denny et al., 2012; D’Argembeau and
Salmon, 2012; Murray et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012; Martinelli
et al., 2013).
The representation of one’s personality traits is the aspect
of self that has been most frequently investigated in functional
neuroimaging studies. In a typical study (see e.g., Kelley et al.,
2002), the brain activity associated with evaluating the self-
descriptiveness of personality traits (e.g., polite, dependable, dar-
ing) is compared to the activity associated with making the same
kind of judgments in reference to another person. Several dozen
studies using this paradigm have been published to date, and two
recent meta-analyses have shown that the medial prefrontal cor-
tex (MPFC)1 is the brain region that is most consistently activated
during trait self-judgments (van der Meer et al., 2010; Murray et al.,
2012). Activations in this region have been observed across differ-
ent age groups, including children (Pfeifer et al., 2007), adolescents
(Schneider et al., 2012), and young and older adults (Gutchess
et al., 2007; Ruby et al., 2009). The evidence further suggests that
the MPFC is involved in representing and evaluating a variety
of different types of personal characteristics, not only one’s per-
sonality traits but also one’s attitudes, values, mental states, and
physical attributes (e.g., Zysset et al., 2002; Jenkins and Mitchell,
2011; Brosch et al., 2012).
The neural basis of autobiographical memory – memories of
one’s past experiences and knowledge of facts about one’s life –
has also received extensive attention (for review, see Maguire,
2001; Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007; Piolino et al., 2009). In many
studies, memories of specific personal experiences (i.e., events
that happened at a particular place and time in an individual’s
life) are compared with the retrieval of non-personal informa-
tion (e.g., non-personal semantic knowledge or stimuli that have
been learned in the laboratory before the scanning session). Sev-
eral meta-analyses have shown that the MPFC is one of the brain
regions most commonly activated during autobiographical mem-
ory retrieval, along with medial and lateral temporal cortices, the
posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, and the inferior parietal
lobe (Gilboa, 2004; Svoboda et al., 2006; McDermott et al., 2009;
Spreng et al., 2009; Kim, 2012; Martinelli et al., 2013). Of partic-
ular interest, a recent meta-analysis has further revealed that the
MPFC is the only brain region that is consistently activated when
thinking about one’s traits, retrieving specific experiences from
one’s past, and accessing knowledge of facts about one’s life, with
both common and distinct MPFC activations across these three
kinds of self-related information (Martinelli et al., 2013).
Besides memories and knowledge of one’s past, an impor-
tant part of self-representation refers to one’s personal goals and
projected future experiences (Markus and Nurius, 1986; Schacter
et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010; Rathbone et al., 2011; D’Argembeau
et al., 2012b). In this regard, a number of studies have shown
that the MPFC is activated when people think about goal states
such as their hopes and aspirations (Johnson et al., 2006, 2009;
Mitchell et al., 2009; Packer and Cunningham, 2009). In recent
years, there has also been a growing interest in the concept of
episodic future thought – the ability to imagine or simulate specific
1It should be noted that the designation of different portions of medial prefrontal
cortex varies somewhat across studies. In this article, I use the term medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) to refer to the entire central portion of the prefrontal cortex, includ-
ing the anterior cingulate gyrus. The label ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC)
is used to refer to a broad area in the lower central portion of the prefrontal cor-
tex, encompassing medial sections of Brodmann’s areas (BA) 10, 11, and lower BA
32, whereas the label dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) refers to the higher
portion of MPFC, encompassing medial sections of BAs 8, 9, and higher BA 32.
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events that might occur in one’s personal future (Schacter et al.,
2008; Szpunar, 2010) – and there is now substantial evidence that
episodic remembering and future thinking largely depend on the
same core network of brain regions, among which the MPFC is a
key player (e.g., Addis et al., 2007; Sharot et al., 2007; Szpunar et al.,
2007; Botzung et al., 2008; for review, see Schacter et al., 2012). Of
interest is the finding that the MPFC is more activated when think-
ing about one’s personal past and future than when contemplating
the non-personal past and future (Abraham et al., 2008). Further-
more, it has been shown that envisioning events in one’s personal
future and reflecting on one’s personality traits are associated with
overlapping activation in the MPFC (D’Argembeau et al., 2010a),
which provides additional evidence that this region is involved in
processing different types of self-related information.
A question that has been debated is whether the MPFC is specif-
ically recruited for processing self-related information or whether
this region is also involved in processing information about other
individuals (Gillihan and Farah, 2005; Legrand and Ruby, 2009;
Wagner et al., 2012). There is evidence that self- and other-related
judgments are associated with overlapping activation in the MPFC,
suggesting that this region may play a broad role in social cogni-
tion (see e.g., Van Overwalle, 2009; Denny et al., 2012). Yet, when
the two kinds of judgments are directly compared to each other,
self-related judgments generally lead to greater activation than
other-related judgments, especially in the vMPFC. For example,
two recent quantitative meta-analyses have shown that the eval-
uation of one’s own personality traits is associated with greater
vMPFC activation compared to the evaluation of the traits of
another person (van der Meer et al., 2010; Murray et al., 2012).
In fact, there seems to be a ventral-dorsal gradient in MPFC such
that increasingly ventral regions of MPFC are more strongly asso-
ciated with making judgments about the self, whereas increasingly
dorsal regions of MPFC are more strongly involved in making
judgments about others (Denny et al., 2012).
A key dimension that influences vMPFC activity when thinking
about others is the closeness of the person to oneself; for example, it
has been shown that the vMPFC responds more strongly to friends
than strangers (Krienen et al., 2010). Studies that have directly
compared self-referential judgments with judgments about close
others have yielded somewhat inconsistent findings, with some
studies observing greater vMPFC activation for self relative to close
others (Heatherton et al., 2006; D’Argembeau et al., 2007, 2008;
Benoit et al., 2010; Krienen et al., 2010), whereas other studies
found comparable levels of activation (Ochsner et al., 2005; Van-
derwal et al., 2008). One possible interpretation of these divergent
findings is that the differential activation of the vMPFC during
self- and other-processing depends on the degree of inclusion of
the close other in one’s sense of self. As briefly mentioned above,
people’s identities not only include elements that are unambigu-
ously part of them (e.g., their body and mental states) but also
outer aspects of their lives, such as their family, friends, and pos-
sessions (James, 1890; Belk, 1988). Notably, research has shown
that people tend to treat the resources, perspectives, and identities
of close others as their own, and that these effects depend on the
extent to which the person is included in their sense of self (Aron
et al., 2004). Interestingly, it has been found that the strength of
activation of the vMPFC when making judgments about the self
versus one’s best friend depends on perceived self-other similar-
ity: participants who perceived themselves as more similar to their
friend exhibited less differential activation between the two kinds
of judgments (Benoit et al., 2010). This finding suggests that the
degree of inclusion of close others in the self is an important deter-
minant of the vMPFC response during self- and other-processing
(see also Zhu et al., 2007).
Outer aspects of self such as one’s group membership and pos-
sessions have also been associated with increased activation in
the vMPFC. Morrison et al. (2012) compared the neural activity
associated with categorizing in-group and out-group words (i.e.,
groups participants felt they belonged to vs. groups they felt they
did not belong to) to identify the brain regions that responded to
one’s group membership. They found that the vMPFC showed
increased activity in response to in-group words compared to
out-group words (see also Volz et al., 2009, for evidence that
more dorsal regions of MPFC also contribute to social identity
processes). Kim and Johnson (2012) investigated the brain regions
supporting the incorporation of external objects in the self. Partici-
pants saw pictures of objects (e.g., clothing, electronic articles) that
were either assigned to themselves or to another person. Objects
were presented on the screen and participants were cued to place
each object either in a basket labeled “mine” or in a basket labeled
with the name of another person (“Alex”), and they were asked to
imagine owning the objects that were assigned to the self. When
contrasting the two kinds of objects, the authors found greater
activation in the vMPFC for objects assigned to the self compared
to objects assigned to the other person. Furthermore, the vMPFC
region that was responsive to self-related objects was also more
activated when participants evaluated their own personality traits
(compared with the traits of another person) in a separate task.
These findings suggest that external objects that have been asso-
ciated with the self modulate activity in the same vMPFC region
as do internal self-representations (see also Kim and Johnson, in
press).
In summary, the studies reviewed in this section show that the
medial portion of the prefrontal cortex, and especially the vMPFC,
is commonly activated when people process a variety of different
kinds of self-related information – their traits, attitudes, values,
physical attributes, goals, memories, future thoughts, close others,
social groups, and possessions. One should note that I focused on
the vMPFC because this is the region that has been most consis-
tently associated with elements of the self-as-object, but of course
this is not the only brain area involved in processing self-related
contents. Other regions that are commonly recruited include the
dMPFC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), inferior frontal cortex,
insula, and regions in medial and lateral temporal cortices (van der
Meer et al., 2010; Denny et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2012; Martinelli
et al., 2013). The vMPFC is structurally and functionally connected
to multiple brain regions (Buckner et al., 2008), and likely inter-
acts with distinct areas and networks depending on the type of
self-related information that is processed at a given moment (see
e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; Martinelli et al., 2013).
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE vMPFC IN SELF-PROCESSING?
While there is substantial evidence that the vMPFC is activated
when people contemplate self-related contents, the precise role of
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this region in self-processing is not well understood and remains
controversial (see e.g., Legrand and Ruby, 2009). Recent findings
suggest that the act of self-reflection in itself may not depend on
the vMPFC. Indeed, the vMPFC responds to self-related contents
even in the absence of explicit self-referential judgments (Moran
et al., 2009; Rameson et al., 2010; Kim and Johnson, in press),
and a recent case study has shown that a patient with extensive
brain damage to the vMPFC has a largely preserved self-concept
and intact introspective and metacognitive abilities (Philippi et al.,
2012). Such evidence suggests that while the vMPFC participates
in the processing of self-related contents (as shown by the neu-
roimaging studies reviewed in the previous section), this region
may not support the formation of self-representations per se. So
what might be the function of the vMPFC during self-processing?
THE VALUATION HYPOTHESIS
Activity changes in the vMPFC are not restricted to tasks requiring
the processing of self-related contents. Indeed, the vMPFC appears
to play a broad role in affective and value-based processing (Phan
et al., 2002; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Kringelbach, 2005; Wal-
lis, 2007; Peters and Buchel, 2010; Rangel and Hare, 2010; Levy
and Glimcher, 2012; Roy et al., 2012). Most notably, research sug-
gests that vMPFC activity encodes the subjective values of various
types of rewards (for review, see Peters and Buchel, 2010; Rangel
and Hare, 2010; Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Sescousse et al., 2013).
For example, neuroeconomic studies have shown that the vMPFC
tracks the magnitude of monetary rewards and the idiosyncratic
values subjects place on those rewards; activity in this area corre-
lates with monetary reward outcome (Knutson et al., 2003), the
subject-specific valuations of gains and losses (Tom et al., 2007),
and subject-specific discounted reward value (Kable and Glim-
cher, 2007). vMPFC activity reflects the subjective value that an
individual assigns to other types of stimuli as well, including pri-
mary rewards (e.g., food) and various types of goods and social
rewards (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Chib et al., 2009; FitzGerald et al.,
2009; Hare et al., 2009, 2010; Lin et al., 2012). Furthermore, it has
been shown that damage to the vMPFC results in disturbances
of subjective valuation (Moretti et al., 2009; Sellitto et al., 2010;
Glascher et al., 2012). Together, these and related findings have led
to the view that the vMPFC integrates information from multiple
sources to represent the significance or value of stimuli (Wallis,
2007; Peters and Buchel, 2010; Rangel and Hare, 2010; Levy and
Glimcher, 2012; Sescousse et al., 2013).
Although the medial prefrontal activations that have been
related to value-based processing are sometimes confined to the
most ventral part of the vMPFC (i.e., the medial orbitofrontal
cortex), many neuroeconomic studies have reported activations
that strikingly overlap with the vMPFC areas that are commonly
detected in self-processing studies (see e.g., Kable and Glimcher,
2007; Chib et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2009). Neuroeconomic studies
focused on the role of the vMPFC in the subjective valuation of
stimuli from the external environment that are only loosely, if at
all, related to self-representations. Yet the findings raise the possi-
bility that vMPFC responses when processing self-related contents
could reflect a similar valuation mechanism. Indeed, self-related
contents are rarely considered in a dispassionate way: stimuli and
mental representations that refer or relate to the self are assigned
unique value and are associated with strong affective investments
(James, 1890; Pelham, 1991; Leary, 2004). The function of the
vMPFC during self-processing may precisely be to appraise or
represent the personal value or significance2 of self-related con-
tents, an idea that is here referred to as the “valuation hypothesis”
(see Figure 1).
The idea that the vMPFC might signal the personal significance
of self-related contents has been echoed by several researchers.
Schmitz and Johnson (2007) have proposed that the vMPFC
instantiates supramodal processes that contribute to detect the
self-relevance of various types of stimuli. Northoff and Hayes
(2011) discussed several ways in which self-relevance and value-
based processing could be related, and argued that although the
two processes may not be reducible to one other, they clearly inter-
act and involve common neural substrates. The evidence reviewed
by these authors, however, mainly focused on the self-relevance of
external stimuli, such as pictures of emotional scenes or reward-
ing stimuli (e.g., Phan et al., 2004; de Greck et al., 2008; Enzi et al.,
2009). Other researchers have proposed and provided more direct
evidence that the vMPFC may also signal the personal significance
of self-related mental contents, such as memories, prospective
thoughts, and representations of one’s personality traits (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010b; D’Argembeau et al., 2010a, 2012a). Finally, a
2By personal value or significance, I simply mean the worth or importance of
something for a particular individual.
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the function of the vMPFC
according to the valuation hypothesis. The vMPFC may represent the
personal value or significance of various types of information, not only
stimuli from the external and internal environment (i.e., sensory and
interoceptive input) but also internally generated mental contents (e.g.,
thoughts, images, memories), including self-representations. Personal
significance is processed along a continuum, such that stimuli and mental
contents are assigned degrees of significance.
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recent meta-analysis has revealed the broad involvement of the
vMPFC across studies of memory, self-representation, social cog-
nition, emotion, reward, pain, and autonomic regulation (Roy
et al., 2012). In an effort to unravel the common denominator
to these seemingly disparate functions, Roy et al. argued that the
vMPFC may integrate various sources of information to conceive
the meaning of events for one’s well-being and future prospects.
A common theme across several proposals is therefore that
the vMPFC encodes personal value or significance. This valua-
tion mechanism may be applied to different kinds of information,
not only stimuli from the external environment but also internally
generated mental contents. From this perspective, the function of
the vMPFC during self-processing may be to appraise or repre-
sent the significance of self-related information. To date, however,
the extent to which activity changes in the vMPFC during self-
processing tasks actually reflect the personal value that is assigned
to self-related contents has not been examined in detail. In the next
section, I discuss several lines of research that provide support for
this hypothesis.
EVIDENCE FOR THE VALUATION HYPOTHESIS
If the vMPFC contributes to assign personal value to self-related
information, then the activity of this region should vary with the
importance that an individual attaches to particular self-related
contents at a given moment. Several lines of evidence suggest that
this is indeed the case.
Taking distance from self-representations
One way to test the valuation hypothesis would be to experimen-
tally manipulate the value that is assigned to self-representations
and to examine whether the processing of these representations
is associated with corresponding changes in vMPFC activity. Sev-
eral studies have done this by investigating the effects of temporal
distance on the neural correlates of self-processing. There is evi-
dence that people value their current self to a greater extent than
temporally distant selves (Wilson and Ross, 2001, 2003), such that
they tend to treat their past and future selves as they would treat
other individuals (Pronin and Ross, 2006; Pronin et al., 2008). If
the vMPFC is involved in assigning value to self-representations,
the activity of this region should be sensitive to these effects of
temporal distance. In one fMRI study, we tested this hypothesis by
comparing the neural correlates of making trait judgments about
the present self versus a past self (D’Argembeau et al., 2008). Par-
ticipants were instructed to reflect on their own traits and those
of a close other, for both their present life period and a past life
period (i.e., 5 years ago). We found that the degree of activity in
the vMPFC varied significantly according to the target of reflec-
tion. Specifically, the vMPFC was more active when participants
thought about their present self than when they thought about
their past self or about the other person; thinking about the past
self and thinking about the other person were associated with
similar levels of activity. In a subsequent study (D’Argembeau
et al., 2010b), we found that this effect of temporal distance was
symmetrical between the past and the future: participants showed
higher activity in the vMPFC when making trait judgments about
their present self than when making trait judgments about them-
selves 5 years ago or 5 years from now (with no difference between
past and future selves). These findings suggest that reducing the
personal significance of self-representations (by increasing tempo-
ral distance) leads to corresponding decreases in vMPFC activity
during self-referential thinking.
Other studies have shown that the magnitude of the differen-
tial activity in the vMPFC when thinking about present versus
future selves correlates with individual differences in the propen-
sity to devalue future rewards. During fMRI scanning, Ersner-
Hershfield et al. (2009) asked participants to judge personality
traits in reference to the self or another person for both the present
and the future (i.e., 10 years from now). Approximately 1 week
after the scanning session, participants returned to the labora-
tory to complete a temporal discounting task in which they had
to make a series of binary choices between an immediate mone-
tary gain and a delayed (but usually larger) gain. In line with the
above-mentioned findings, a region of the vMPFC showed greater
activation for present self trials than for future self and other tri-
als. Furthermore, a measure of differences in neural activation in
this region between present and future self trials correlated posi-
tively with individual estimates of temporal discounting. In other
words, participants who displayed greater activity in the vMPFC
when thinking about present versus future selves showed a greater
propensity to devalue future rewards. Related findings have been
reported in a study in which participants were scanned while they
predicted how much they would enjoy engaging in each of a series
of activities (e.g., spending the afternoon in a modern art museum)
either in the present or in the future (a year later) (Mitchell et al.,
2011). It was found that the vMPFC was more activated when
predicting present compared to future enjoyment. Furthermore,
differences in vMPFC activity between predictions of present and
future enjoyment correlated positively with individual differences
in the tendency to discount future monetary rewards, as assessed
by intertemporal choice tasks. Thus, there is converging evidence
that people who display greater reduction in vMPFC activity when
thinking about future compared to present selves have a higher
tendency to devalue future rewards. A plausible interpretation of
this finding is that the vMPFC provides a signal reflecting the value
that is placed on self-related contents for different time periods.
Psychological investment in self-representations
Perhaps the most direct evidence for the role of the vMPFC in
representing the value of self-related information comes from a
recent study that investigated the neural correlates of psychological
investments in self-representations (D’Argembeau et al., 2012a).
People have many different ideas and beliefs about who they are
and what they are like, but they do not treat all self-views the same.
Research has shown that we place more or less importance on
particular self-views (our emotive investment) and hold different
self-views with more or less confidence (our epistemic invest-
ment) (Pelham, 1991). For example, someone might attach much
importance in being honest (high emotive investment), while con-
sidering that punctuality is not a particularly important trait for
her to possess (low emotive investment); and for both traits, this
person might feel more or less confident that she truly possesses
these attributes (her epistemic investment). If the vMPFC repre-
sents the personal significance of self-related information, then
the degree of neural activity in this region should correlate with
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one’s investments in self-representations, and in particular with
emotive investments.
To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to make self-
descriptiveness judgments regarding a variety of traits (e.g., hon-
est, shy, punctual) while their brain activity was measured using
fMRI (D’Argembeau et al., 2012a). Immediately after the scan-
ning session, participants were presented again with the same set
of traits and were instructed to rate the certainty of their self-
representation regarding each trait (i.e., “how certain are you that
you possess or do not possess this trait?”; from 1= not at all,
to 4= completely), and the importance they attach to this self-
representation (i.e., “how important is it for you to possess or
not possess this trait?”; from 1= not at all important, to 4= very
important). These ratings thus provided indexes of participants’
epistemic and emotive investments in each self-representation that
had been processed during scanning. We then correlated the fMRI
signal obtained during the self-descriptiveness judgments with the
ratings of certainty and importance, which allowed us to iden-
tify the brain regions that responded to epistemic and emotive
investments in self-representations on a trial-by-trial basis. The
results showed that ratings of certainty and importance were cor-
related with neural activity in the MPFC, in both common and
distinct MPFC areas. When looking at the brain regions that were
specifically related to each kind of investment, we found that a
region of the dMPFC responded specifically to the certainty of
self-views, whereas a region of the vMPFC responded specifically
to the importance of self-views. In other words, the level of activ-
ity of the vMPFC when participants contemplated their personal
traits depended on their emotive investment in the particular self-
representation under consideration: the higher the value attached
to a self-representation, the stronger the response of the vMPFC.
It should be reminded that participants did not explicitly reflect
on the importance attached to their self-representations during
scanning, such that the observed activity in the vMPFC is unlikely
to reflect the engagement of explicit evaluation processes. Instead,
the vMPFC might automatically confer degrees of value to the
conceptions of the self that we form in our minds when we think
about ourselves.
Other evidence suggests that the vMPFC is also involved in
assigning personal significance to mental representations of events
and facts from one’s life. In one fMRI study, we asked participants
to imagine future events that were related to their personal goals
(e.g., getting married next summer) and future events that were
plausible and could be vividly imagined but were unrelated to
their personal goals (e.g., taking a pottery lesson next summer), as
determined by individualized pre-scan interviews (D’Argembeau
et al., 2010a). We found that the vMPFC (as well as the PCC)
showed greater activation when participants imaged future events
that were related to their goals compared to future events that were
unrelated to their goals. Importantly, these two types of future
events were matched for vividness and temporal distance, sug-
gesting that the observed differences in brain activation cannot be
accounted by these factors. Instead, a plausible interpretation is
that the increased activation of the vMPFC reflects the greater
personal significance of events that are related to one’s goals.
This interpretation receives some support from another study
that analyzed the component processes subserved by different
brain regions when people engaged in self-referential thinking.
Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) found that the vMPFC and PCC
were more activated when participants answered questions about
various issues and events in their personal life (e.g., “Think about
the major issues in your life at this moment. Which of these issues
concerns you the most: health, education, or finance?”) than when
they answered questions requiring the retrieval of general seman-
tic knowledge (e.g., “At this moment there is a leading candidate
in the Republican Party for President. Which of the following can-
didates is that candidate: Mitt Romney, Senator John McCain, or
Rudy Giuliani?”). Additionally, various component processes that
could be engaged when answering these different questions (e.g.,
mental imagery, recall of past experiences, affective processing,
and so on) were assessed by an independent group of participants.
This showed that three components were recruited to a greater
extent when answering questions about the self: personal signifi-
cance, evoked emotion, and introspection about one’s preferences,
feelings, and emotions. When these three variables were combined
into a composite score of “affective self-relevance,” this composite
variable was found to account for a large portion of the trial-by-
trial variance in activity within the vMPFC–PCC. The authors
concluded that the vMPFC (along with the PCC) participates in
evaluating aspects of personal significance.
Individual differences in valuing self-reflection
People differ in the extent to which they attach importance and
manifest interest in introspecting about the self and their life
(Trapnell and Campbell, 1999). In one study, we found that such
individual differences modulate the activity of the vMPFC when
people reflect on significant personal experiences (D’Argembeau
et al., in press). Participants were asked to approach a set of per-
sonally significant memories in two different ways: on some trials,
they remembered the concrete content of the events (e.g., what
happened, where, when, with whom, and so on), whereas on other
trials they reflected on the broader meaning and implications of
their memories for the self (e.g., they thought about what the event
says about their personality, how they have changed following this
event, what they have learned, and so on). Individual differences
in interest in this kind of self-reflection were assessed using a vali-
dated questionnaire that included items such as “I love exploring
my inner self” (Trapnell and Campbell, 1999). We found that a
number of brain regions (including the dMPFC, inferior frontal
gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and angular gyrus) were more acti-
vated when participants reflected on the meaning of their past
experiences compared to when they remembered the concrete
content of these experiences. The vMPFC was not consistently
activated across participants but, interestingly, there was a positive
correlation between the activity of the vMPFC and scores on the
questionnaire assessing one’s interest in self-reflection. That is, the
vMPFC showed increased activity when reflecting on the meaning
of past experiences only for participants who have greater interest
and willingness to introspect about the self.
Valuing outer aspects of self
As mentioned above, the vMPFC has been found to be more acti-
vated in response to objects that have been assigned to the self
compared with objects that have been assigned to another person
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(Kim and Johnson, 2012, in press). Of particular interest, Kim
and Johnson also found that the vMPFC was more activated in
response to objects that were more preferred by the participants
(as determined by post-scan ratings), but only for objects that
had been assigned to the self. Furthermore, the participants’ will-
ingness to trade their own objects for the other person’s objects
was negatively correlated with vMPFC activity. These findings
strongly suggest that the vMPFC represents the subjective value
of self-related objects. Other studies have shown that the vMPFC
responds to the self-relatedness of emotional or rewarding stim-
uli. Phan et al. (2004) found that the activation of the vMPFC
in response to pictures of emotional scenes correlated with the
extent to which participants associated to the pictures, especially
(but not exclusively) when they explicitly reflected on the self-
relatedness of the stimuli (see also Northoff et al., 2009). Related
findings have been reported by de Greck et al. (2008) who found
that the response of the vMPFC to pictures of rewarding stimuli
(e.g., food items) was greater when the stimuli were judged to be
high (compared to low) in self-relatedness (see also Enzi et al.,
2009). As noted earlier, there is also evidence that the vMPFC is
activated when thinking about persons that tend to be included in
one’s sense of self, such as close others. From this finding, Krienen
et al. (2010) concluded that the vMPFC contributes to “evaluate or
provide a signal reflecting the personal significance of close others”
(p. 13911). Taken together, these different studies suggest that the
vMPFC represents the personal significance of a variety of outer
self-related contents.
Summary
Although relatively few studies to date have directly tested the
valuation hypothesis, several lines of evidence converge to sug-
gest that vMPFC activity during self-processing depends on the
personal significance of self-related contents. First, increasing psy-
chological distance (in particular, temporal distance) from self-
representations leads to decreased activity in the vMPFC during
self-reflective thinking. Second, vMPFC activity increases linearly
with the personal importance of the self-representations under
consideration. Third, individual differences in the interest placed
on self-reflection modulate the activity of the vMPFC during self-
reflective thinking. Finally, the vMPFC responds to outer aspects
of self that have high personal value, such as possessions and close
others. Taken together, these findings provide support to the view
that the vMPFC contributes to assign personal value to self-related
information.
PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH
Assigning personal value to self-related contents may be essen-
tial for constructing and stabilizing coherent self-representations
(Markus, 1977; Pelham, 1991). Indeed, it has been suggested that
disturbance in the brain’s systems that assign personal signifi-
cance may contribute to the alterations of self boundaries that are
observed in some psychiatric disorders (Feinberg, 2011). In addi-
tion, an excessive investment in, and identification with, rigid and
dysfunctional self-views may also play an important role in depres-
sion and anxiety (Clark and Beck, 2010). It is therefore interesting
to note that various forms of psychopathology are characterized by
altered patterns of activity in the vMPFC during self-processing.
For example, it has been found that the differential activity in the
vMPFC when processing self-related compared to non-self-related
contents is reduced in schizophrenia (Holt et al., 2011) and absent
in autism (Lombardo et al., 2010); depression has been associated
with both abnormal increases and decreases in vMPFC activity
during self-processing (Lemogne et al., 2012); and patients with
social anxiety disorder show atypical modulation of vMPFC activ-
ity in response to self-referential comments (Blair et al., 2011). An
intriguing possibility is that these alterations in the functioning of
the vMPFC may contribute to the abnormalities in the process-
ing of personal significance that are observed in these different
disorders.
Some interventions have proven their efficacy in addressing
dysfunctional self-views and recent studies suggest that their
effects may in part be mediated by a modulation of vMPFC activ-
ity during self-processing. Research has shown that the practice
of mindfulness meditation – paying attention to one’s current
experience in a non-evaluative way – has beneficial effects across
diverse psychological disorders as well as for well-being (for review,
see Brown et al., 2007; Keng et al., 2011). These salutary effects
are likely due to multiple mechanisms of actions and may, in
part, involve a change in perspective on the self (Holzel et al.,
2011). By closely observing the contents of consciousness in a
non-judgmental way, practitioners learn to see their thoughts and
emotions as transient mental events. Through this process, one
adopts a more detached perspective on the self, which may foster
a disidentification from, and modification of, rigid and dysfunc-
tional self-views (Holzel et al., 2011; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012)
and may lead to more accurate self-knowledge (Carlson, 2013).
Farb et al. (2007) specifically investigated the neural correlates
of such change in perspective on the self following mindful-
ness practice (for a comprehensive review of the neurobiologi-
cal changes promoted by mindfulness, see Vago and Silbersweig,
2012). Participants who completed mindfulness training were
compared with participants who had not yet undergone train-
ing while they engaged in two modes of self-reference: in one
condition, they were asked to think about the personal meaning
and self-descriptiveness of trait adjectives (referred to as “narra-
tive” focus), whereas in another condition they were instructed
to monitor their moment-to-moment experience in response to
the adjectives (referred to as “experiential” focus). In line with the
neuroimaging studies of self-processing reviewed above, narrative
self-focus induced activation in several brain regions, includ-
ing the vMPFC, in both groups of participants. Interestingly,
however, individuals who completed the mindfulness training
showed larger reductions in vMPFC activity during the experi-
ential (compared with the narrative) focus, along with increased
engagement of the right lateral prefrontal cortex, right insula, sec-
ondary somatosensory cortex, and inferior parietal lobule. The
authors interpreted these findings as representing a shift “toward
more lateral prefrontal regions supporting a more self-detached
and objective analysis of interoceptive (insula) and exteroceptive
(somatosensory cortex) sensory events, rather than their affec-
tive or subjective self-referential value” (Farb et al., 2007, p. 319).
Another study has shown that mindfulness practice influences
functional connectivity between the vMPFC and other regions
involved in self-processing, which may in part “reflect a reduction
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in emotional appraisal during self-referent processes”(Taylor et al.,
2013, p. 12). Although these results are compelling, it should be
noted that a study in patients with social phobia failed to find
significant changes in vMPFC activity during self-processing fol-
lowing mindfulness training (Goldin et al., 2012), so additional
research (in both healthy individuals and in various psychological
disorders) is needed to further examine the possible contribution
of the vMPFC in mindfulness-induced changes in self-processing.
Other evidence suggests that modifications of patterns
of vMPFC activity during self-processing may underlie the
restructuration of dysfunctional self-views following cognitive-
behavioral therapy in depression (Yoshimura et al., in press). A
group of depressive patients underwent a cognitive-behavioral
intervention program that involved, among other things, the
identification and restructuration of negative self-views and the
development of positive thinking about the self. The patients
were scanned before and after the therapy while they made self-
descriptiveness judgments on positive and negative traits. Before
therapy, the patients showed higher activity in the vMPFC when
considering negative compared with positive aspects of the self (see
also Lemogne et al., 2012, for a review of studies showing abnor-
malities of MPFC activity during self-processing in depression).
From pre- to post-therapy, there was a decrease in vMPFC activity
when thinking about negative aspects of the self and an increase in
vMPFC activity when thinking about positive aspects of the self,
such that following therapy the patients recruited the vMPFC to
a greater extent when considering positive compared with nega-
tive aspects of themselves. This shift in patterns of vMPFC activity
from pre- to post-therapy may result from a restructuration of
the relative value that the patients placed on their positive versus
negative self-views, such that positive conceptions of the self are
assigned greater significance following treatment.
THE vMPFC AND SPONTANEOUS SELF-RELATED THOUGHTS
The vMPFC is a central hub of the default network – a set of inter-
acting brain regions that show increased activity during “resting”
states compared with active, externally focused tasks (Shulman
et al., 1997; Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Mazoyer et al., 2001;
Buckner et al., 2008). Although the exact function of this network
remains somewhat controversial, a prominent hypothesis is that
it supports internal mentation during rest and passive task con-
ditions (Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012). When our
attention is not focused on a given task, we spontaneously experi-
ence all sorts of thoughts and mental images: we may, for example,
revisit a past event or think about things to do in the future (Small-
wood et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a; Stawarczyk et al.,
2011a). In line with the internal mentation hypothesis, a number
of studies have linked this kind of spontaneous mental activity to
the default network (McKiernan et al., 2006; Mason et al., 2007;
Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a; Stawarczyk
et al., 2011b).
Recent findings further suggest that the default network com-
prises multiple subsystems that likely support distinct component
processes involved in internal mentation (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010b). Of particular interest here is the finding that the rest-
ing state and explicit self-processing are associated with shared
activation in the vMPFC. In a pioneering study, Andreasen et al.
(1995) used positron emission tomography (PET) to investigate
similarities and differences in neural activity between the explicit
retrieval of autobiographical memories and a rest condition (i.e.,
lying quietly with no specific instructions about mental activ-
ity). They found that the vMPFC and precuneus showed greater
activity during both autobiographical memory retrieval and rest
compared to a semantic memory condition. Interviews with the
participants indicated that they thought about a variety of things
during the rest condition, but especially about self-related con-
tents such as past experiences and future activities. The authors
concluded that the psychological commonality between the rest
and autobiographical memory conditions is that “both involve
something personal and highly individual” (p. 1583).
Another PET study investigated the commonalities in brain
activation between rest and the explicit reflection on one’s per-
sonality traits (D’Argembeau et al., 2005). It was found that both
conditions were associated with common activation in the vMPFC
compared with conditions requiring participants to reflect on non-
self-related contents (see also Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011). Fur-
thermore, an analysis of the content of mental activity (using ver-
bal reports and rating scales obtained after each scan) showed that
participants spontaneously experienced self-referential thoughts
during the rest condition and that the amount of self-referential
processing correlated specifically with the activity of the vMPFC.
A recent quantitative meta-analysis has confirmed that the rest-
ing state and explicit self-processing are associated with common
activations in the vMPFC. Qin and Northoff (2011) compared
the location of activations in studies on the default network (i.e.,
brain regions showing stronger activation during the resting state
compared to active tasks) with the location of activations associ-
ated with various self-related tasks (e.g., trait judgments, autobio-
graphical memory, face recognition, and name perception). These
authors found that the resting state and self-related tasks showed
overlapping activations in a region of the vMPFC.
Overall, these findings suggest that the vMPFC is engaged in
both intentional (in explicit self-referential tasks) and sponta-
neous (in the resting state) self-processing. In light of the valuation
hypothesis, an intriguing possibility is that the activation of the
vMPFC during the resting state may signal the personal signif-
icance of spontaneous cognitions – be they memories, future
thoughts, or other reflections on self-related contents. In this way,
the vMPFC might contribute to highlight and select, among the
many thoughts and mental images that spontaneously populate
our minds in daily life, representations that are likely to have some
relevance for guiding our decisions and behavior.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite extensive evidence that the vMPFC is involved in pro-
cessing self-related contents, the precise function of this region
is still elusive. Here I have suggested that a key dimension that
may shed light on this issue is the notion of personal significance.
Stimuli and mental representations that refer or relate to the self
tend to be assigned unique value, and the function of the vMPFC
may precisely be to evaluate or represent such significance. The
notion of personal significance should be conceived as a contin-
uum, such that some self-related contents are assigned more value
than others. Furthermore, the personal value of a given content
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is probably not fixed once for all, but may instead vary accord-
ing to the context and evolve across time. By flexibly assigning
degrees of value to self-related contents, the vMPFC may play an
important role in the construction, stabilization, and modifica-
tion of self-representations, and ultimately in guiding our choices
and decisions. Although this is certainly not the sole ingredient of
our sense of self, the representation of personal significance in the
vMPFC may contribute to establish the fundamental distinction
between self and non-self that each of us subjectively experiences.
While the evidence reviewed in this article provides support to
the valuation hypothesis, many questions remain and this hypoth-
esis clearly requires further investigation. First, the notion of
personal significance is admittedly quite vague and requires fur-
ther refinement. The relevance of something can be considered
at numerous levels – from basic physiological needs to higher-
order goals, motives, and values – and it will be important in
future work to dissect the precise dimensional features of rele-
vance that may be represented in the vMPFC. A related question
is whether personal significance can be entirely reduced to valua-
tion, as defined in the neuroeconomic literature, or whether they
represent (at least partly) dissociable processes (see Northoff and
Hayes, 2011, for further discussion of this issue). Recent findings
suggest that different dimensions of value (i.e., economic vs. core
value) can be dissociated in the MPFC (Brosch et al., 2012) and
that the vMPFC can process value independently of self-relevance
(Nicolle et al., 2012). Thus, it remains to be determined whether
the same valuation scale is applied to self-related versus non-self-
related contents or whether the two types of contents are processed
along qualitatively different dimensions of value. From this per-
spective, it will also be important to investigate whether and how
different value dimensions are processed by the vMPFC and other
brain structures that have been associated with relevance detec-
tion, such as the amygdala and ventral striatum (see e.g., Sander
et al., 2003; Adolphs, 2010). Interestingly, it has been found that the
vMPFC is functionally coupled to the amygdala and ventral stria-
tum when processing self-related contents (Schmitz and Johnson,
2006), but the specific contribution of each of these areas remains
to be determined.
Another question relates to the functional specialization within
the vMPFC. In this article, I have considered the vMPFC as a whole
but this is of course a fairly large area that comprises multiple sub-
regions (Ongur et al., 2003). Activations in some neuroimaging
studies of self-processing are quite extensive, encompassing mul-
tiple vMPFC subregions (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2010b), whereas
other studies have reported activations in specific subregions, such
as the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield
et al., 2009), the rostral vMPFC (BA 10) (e.g., Benoit et al., 2010),
or the medial orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., Hughes and Beer, 2012).
It is likely that distinct areas within the vMPFC support differ-
ent processes, some of which may not be directly related to the
assignment of personal significance. However, the functional spe-
cialization within the vMPFC remains largely unexplored in the
context of self-processing. Likewise,whether the exact same area(s)
of vMPFC are involved in representing the value of self-related and
non-self-related contents has not been directly investigated. Exam-
ining the functional properties of different vMPFC areas across
species that differ in their ability to form self-representations, as
well as at different developmental stages of self-representational
abilities in humans, might shed some light on these questions.
This raises the broader question of whether a common valua-
tion mechanism is applied to various kinds of stimuli and mental
contents regardless of their peculiarities. Previous research sug-
gests that the vMPFC encodes the subjective value of different
types of rewards on a common neural scale (Peters and Buchel,
2010; Rangel and Hare, 2010; Levy and Glimcher, 2012), yet
there also appears to be some functional specialization within
the vMPFC according to types of rewards. In particular, the
evidence suggests a posterior–anterior distinction within the
vMPFC according to levels of abstraction, with more abstract
rewards being represented more anteriorly than less abstract
rewards (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005;
Sescousse et al., 2013). Self-representations can also be more or less
abstract and it would be interesting to investigate whether these
variations can be mapped onto a similar posterior–anterior axis
within the vMPFC (see Martinelli et al., 2013, for recent evidence
suggesting that this might in part be the case).
Finally, the role of automatic and controlled processes in the
assignment of personal significance deserves further attention.
The processing of personal significance is not necessarily conscious
and deliberate, and in fact it likely operates outside of awareness
most of the time (Bargh and Morsella, 2008). As already noted,
current evidence suggests that the vMPFC may automatically con-
fer degrees of value to self-related contents (D’Argembeau et al.,
2012a),but of course this does not mean that this process cannot be
modulated by conscious awareness; indeed, the research reviewed
above suggests that mindfulness practice can lead to significant
changes in how one approaches self-related contents. Identifying
the exact conditions under which the processing of personal signif-
icance can be influenced by conscious monitoring processes, and
the role of the vMPFC in this respect, is an important avenue for
future research that could potentially deepen our understanding
of healthy and unhealthy ways of relating to oneself.
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